The article addresses the claim that the "left populist" governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela failed to effectively reduce inequality in the 2000s. The author examines the econometric evidence presented by McLeod and Lustig (2011) that the "social democratic" governments of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay were more successful and shows that McLeod and Lustig's results are highly sensitive to their use of data from the Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). Conducting the same analysis using inequality data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) suggests the exactly opposite conclusion. The contrast between the results obtained using SEDLAC and ECLAC data suggests that the choice of inequality data source is not immaterial and that the difference is probably driven by how the two sources handle the underreporting of income in household surveys.
using data on inequality from the Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). 1 McLeod and Lustig show that after accounting for favorable external conditions, structural determinants of inequality, and the impact of historical and institutional factors, Latin America's "social democratic" governments-Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay-appear to have effectively reduced inequality, while the "left-populist" governments have not.
In this article, I attempt to reproduce their findings using data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The main result that emerges is that the choice of data source matters tremendously. In fact, conducting the same analysis using data from ECLAC, instead of from SEDLAC, leads to results exactly opposite to those reported by McLeod and Lustig: it is the "left-populist" governments that now appear to have most effectively reduced inequality.
A BIT OF BACKGROUND: GOOD POLICIES OR GOOD LUCK?
Latin America has undergone major changes throughout the past two decades. Where once authoritarian regimes of one form or another ruled most of the region, democracy has now become the rule rather than the exception. Perhaps more remarkably, beginning around the end of the 1990s, the consolidation of democracy was accompanied by a marked shift to the left of the political spectrum. As the number of left-of-center governments increased, however, some scholars and commentators began to distinguish between what they saw as two lefts: a moderate left with respect for property rights and market forces, and an "undemocratic" left rooted in the region's populist past (Castañeda (4) and Vargas Llosa (5) are prominent examples of this discourse). The former, according to these narratives, is modern, technocratic, and delivers on its promises because of well-designed policies. The latter type, on the other hand, has simply benefited temporarily from a commodity boom, and their policies will eventually prove unsustainable.
These changes in the political realm coincided with sustained improvements in social indicators, including significant reductions in inequality in most countries of Latin America (6) . Figure 1 compares the levels of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, for the 2007-2009 period and for [2001] [2002] [2003] . The farther a country appears below (above) the 45-degree line, the more it decreased (increased) inequality between the two periods. Thus, as can be seen below, by the end of the last decade, most countries for which data are available managed to reduce inequality, and in some cases by considerable amounts.
The causes behind these widespread improvements, however, are disputed. As McLeod and Lustig (1, p. 2) observe, this period was also marked by remarkably benign external conditions, as exemplified, for instance, by favorable terms of trade and bountiful inflows of capital from international financial markets. Thus, it is far from clear whether these improvements were the result of good policy or simply good luck, or whether the countries with left-of-center governments did significantly better than the rest (1, pp. 5-8). To disentangle these various effects, McLeod and Lustig set up a formal econometric framework to test the effectiveness at reducing inequality of both "social democratic" and "left-populist" governments. Using data from SEDLAC, their results suggest that after accounting for unobserved country-specific fixed effects and controlling for a variety of different factors, the "left-populist" governments no longer appear to have had a statistically significant effect on inequality.
Furthermore, on the basis of their fixed-effects framework, discussed in detail below, they also conclude that the decreases in inequality in the "left-populist" countries should be interpreted as returns to historical norms, while the decreases in the "social democratic" countries represent a historic "break from the past." However, as we will see below, these results are highly sensitive to the choice of data source and, in the absence of compelling criteria for choosing one over the other, any conclusions should be regarded with a healthy amount of skepticism.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
One of the main problems surrounding data on inequality in many countries is that the household surveys on which they are based are often intermittent and seldom conducted on an annual basis. (Although, of course, there is a myriad of other problems surrounding household survey design and implementation in Latin America and limitations regarding their comparability between countries and across time (7) ). As such, time series with observations for each year, and going back far enough to be useful, are rarely available. To deal with this problem, I follow McLeod and Lustig (1) and conduct the analysis using threeyear periods, covering 1989-2009. For example, period 1 covers 1989-1991, period 2 covers 1992-1994, and so on. This approach allows the construction of a nearly uninterrupted panel dataset.
It is worth noting that unlike McLeod and Lustig's original analysis, my period ranges from 1989 to 2009 (instead of 1988 to 2008). The main advantage of this alternative time period is that it allows the inclusion of updated ECLAC inequality data for Venezuela, which are available up to 2009. Including the latest available data is especially important considering that Venezuela's measured inequality fell dramatically between 2007 and 2009. Unfortunately, the SEDLAC data, on which McLeod and Lustig's original results were based, do not have observations for Venezuela after 2006, meaning that their assessment of the effectiveness of "left-populist" regimes at reducing inequality missed out on arguably the most important time period for Venezuela-one of their four key "left-populist" regimes.
The ECLAC Gini coefficient numbers were chosen to be representative of the three-year period. If available, the value for the middle year of the period was chosen, and if not available the last year of the period was chosen instead. If neither the middle nor the last year were available, then the first year of the three-year period was chosen. The rest of the explanatory variables, with the one exception of the political regime variables, are averages over each three-year period.
The main explanatory variables of interest, the cumulative years in power of "social democratic" and "left-populist" governments, were constructed using McLeod and Lustig's methodology, which is based on the political regime typology discussed by Kaufman (8) . These variables count the cumulative number of "effective" years in power for each type of leftist government, or in other words, they count each year after the first in office. This captures the idea that any policies implemented by a particular government wouldn't take effect right away. Table 1 shows the cumulative years in power of each regime type. Venezuela's Hugo Chávez became the first of the new left leaders in Latin America, elected in December 1998 and assuming power in February 1999. As such, Venezuela receives one effective year in power for the "left-populist" category in period 4, which spans 1998-2000. Similarly, under this typology, the election of Chile's Ricardo Lagos in 2000 marks Chile's turn to the left, and the "social democratic" category registers three cumulative effective years in period 5.
This typology of Latin American leftist regimes should be considered cautiously. For instance, classifying Chile as "social democratic" beginning with the election of socialist Ricardo Lagos is problematic and debatable, considering the political continuity between his administration and that of his predecessor, Eduardo Frei. Chile's turn to the left, in other words, could arguably have Decreasing Inequality in Latin America / 261 Table 1 Cumulative effective years in power by regime type, selected Latin American countries 
where SD it and LP it are the cumulative effective years in power of "social democratic" and "left-populist" regimes, respectively, in country i during period t; x it is a vector of control variables, described below; u i is the country-specific intercept or fixed effect of each country i; n t is a vector of time-dummies, and e it is an independent and identically distributed error term.
The fixed country effects control for unobserved time invariant differences between countries, while the time-dummies control for unobserved effects that vary across time. The fixed effects capture the notion that there are deep historical and institutional factors in each country that determine the level of inequality, while the time-dummies take into account the possibility of external shocks influencing inequality across the entire region. To capture the structural impact of the level of development on inequality, the regressions also control for each country's level of GDP (gross domestic product) per capita. To examine the extent to which the changes in inequality were driven by favorable external conditions, the regressions also include a measure of the terms of trade, as well as the size of merchandise exports as a share of GDP and fuel exports as a share of total merchandise trade. Table 2 shows the results of the regression analysis using data from ECLAC instead of from SEDLAC (summary statistics are provided in Appendix Table 1 , p. 271). As can be seen in Table 2 , the main result that emerges from the regression analysis is that the "left-populist" regimes appear to have significantly reduced inequality, while the "social democratic" ones do not; these results are robust across several different specifications. The estimates suggest that after controlling for structural, external, and unobserved country-specific factors, "left-populist" governments effectively reduced the Gini coefficient by between 0.47 and 0.65 percentage points per cumulative year in office.
RESULTS
The five regressions, shown in Table 2 columns (a) through (e), match McLeod and Lustig's original specifications (1, p. 19) . It is worth mentioning that in their original analysis using SEDLAC data, much of the significance of the "social democratic" regime variables hinged on the exclusion of Uruguay. This is problematic, because Uruguay is one of only three "social democratic" governments in the sample. Nevertheless, to match their original specifications, Uruguay is excluded from the analysis in the regressions in columns (a) through (d) and is included in the last regression in column (e).
Column (a) shows the results of the regression without the control variables, with the Gini coefficient as a function of only the cumulative years in power of "social democratic" and "left-populist" regimes and the level of real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms. The coefficient on the "left-populist" cumulative years in power variable is negative, indicating that "left-populist" governments are associated with reduced inequality; it is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Log real GDP per capita is also negative and significant, consistent with the idea that more developed countries tend to have lower structural levels of inequality.
By contrast, the coefficient on the cumulative years of power for "social democratic" governments is not significant. Thus, the results for this regression, for both of these variables, are the opposite of what McLeod and Lustig found.
Following McLeod and Lustig's specifications, the regression in column (b) introduces controls for the level of government consumption, public social spending, and the rate of inflation. As can be seen, "left-populist" regimes now appear to have had an even larger effect on reducing inequality than in the first regression, and this is significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient on social spending as percent of GDP is negative, as expected, though not statistically significant. Government consumption appears highly regressive and significant at the 1 percent level.
The use of government consumption and social spending as control variables in these regressions is highly questionable, since these are likely to be important channels through which governments that intend to reduce inequality may do so. Although this regression shows government consumption to be regressive, the opposite was found to be true when looking only at "left-populist" governments; social spending was found to be correlated with reduced inequality for both "social democratic" and "left-populist" governments. 2 Columns (c) and (d) in Table 2 show the results from using alternative regime variables and controlling for the terms of trade, remittances, merchandise exports, and the fuel share of exports. Instead of the cumulative years in power of each regime type, the alternative regime variables count the number of years in power per period. For example, the alternative "social democratic" variable records three years in period 7 for Chile, instead of nine years in the cumulative variable. As can be seen, the alternative regime variable is less robust than the cumulative years in power. While neither the "left-populist" nor the "social democratic" governments appear significant in regression (c), the results change significantly after controlling for the level of government consumption and social spending in regression (d). The coefficient on the alternative "left-populist" variable is now almost twice Abbreviations: SD, "social democratic"; LP, "left-populist"; GDP, gross domestic product; PPP, purchasing power parity; CPI, consumer price index.
as large as and more statistically significant than in regression (a). These large differences between (c) and (d) suggest that the alternative regime variables are probably not very reliable and that the cumulative years in power provide a better measure. The regression in column (e) uses the original cumulative years in power variables and controls for the level of real GDP per capita, the rate of inflation, the terms of trade, remittances, merchandise exports as a share of GDP, and the fuel share of exports. As seen in the table, the coefficient on the "left-populist" variable is significant at the 1 percent level and the same as the estimate in regression (b). The "social democratic" regime variable is not significant, once again reversing the results of McCleod and Lustig.
Finally, the control variables meant to capture the impact of external conditions do not appear very robust. As seen in Table 2 , the terms of trade variable has the expected negative sign in (c) through (e) but is only significant in (d). Similarly, the variable for the fuel share of merchandise exports appears consistently positive-in line with theories about the "resource curse"-but is only significant in (d), and only at the 10 percent level. Remittance flows and merchandise exports as a share of GDP both have the expected negative signs, but neither appears statistically significant in any of the specifications.
One common problem associated with the analysis of time-series data is the possibility of serial correlation in the error term, when the model's disturbances are correlated across time. Serial correlation violates the assumption that the model's disturbances are random and non-correlated with each other, rendering the estimated coefficients inefficient and leading to unreliably lower standard errors in the regression. In other words, if serial correlation is a problem, variables will tend to appear more statistically significant than they actually are, and one may be inclined to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are not significantly different from zero when perhaps one should not.
To assess whether serial correlation is a problem, I used a panel data serial correlation test discussed by Wooldridge (9) and implemented by Drukker (10) . The test is based on Wooldridge's insight that if the model does not exhibit serial correlation, then regressing the residuals from a regression of the model's first difference on the lagged residuals should yield a coefficient of -0.50. As such, the test runs a regression of the model's first difference and then performs a Wald test to see whether the coefficient on the lagged residuals is significantly different from -0.50.
The p-values from the Wooldridge test are shown at the bottom of Table 2 . The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. As can be seen, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 percent level in regressions (a) and (e), and at the 5 percent level in regressions (b) through (d). This suggests the presence of serial correlation and that the standard errors could be biased. The evidence of serial correlation is surprising, given that the regressions use three-year periods, and could probably indicate that the model is misspecified.
It is possible to correct for the presence of serial correlation, although it is unclear whether this is appropriate if there is reason to suspect the serial correlation is driven by misspecification. One common way to take it into account is to use fixed-effects regressions with Baltagi-Wu serial correlation-robust (AR(1)) standard errors. The estimation process is based on Baltagi and Wu's (11) panel data extension of the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, which uses the estimated value of r, the serial correlation parameter, to remove the serially correlated component from the data. The approach estimates r by running a Prais-Winsten and Cochrane-Orcutt regression on the demeaned data.
Rerunning regressions (a) through (e) with Baltagi-Wu AR(1) errors (see Appendix Table 2 , pp. 272-273) suggests that the main results are not affected significantly by the presence of serial correlation, as the "left-populist" regimes are now significant at the 1 percent level in (a) and at the 5 percent level in (b) and (c). However, as expected based on the evidence of serial correlation, the standard errors are larger in all five specifications, and the "left-populist" variables lose their significance in (d) and (e).
THE DATA SOURCE MATTERS: ECLAC OR SEDLAC?
It is clearly problematic that such completely different results-reversing the main conclusions of McLeod and Lustig-emerge simply from using different data sources. Such a major discrepancy suggests that, absent a good reason to trust one source over the other, this research should be regarded with a healthy amount of skepticism, and that further research on the underlying differences between SEDLAC and ECLAC data is in order. This is especially the case if one considers the broader political narratives to which these conflicting results can lend themselves.
As seen in Table 3 , the Gini coefficients reported by ECLAC in some cases differ from SEDLAC's by as much as 17 percent. These large differences in measured inequality are all the more surprising given that both datasets are based on the same underlying official household income surveys. The key difference between the two datasets lies in the handling of the raw survey results. In particular, ECLAC explicitly adjusts the survey results for income underreportingwhen households in an income survey underreport their true amount of income, thus biasing the measurement of inequality-while SEDLAC does not. 3 Because income underreporting is probably more pronounced in wealthier households, failing to adjust for underreporting is expected to lead to a lower and biased estimate of inequality. However, since the actual pattern of underreporting is Decreasing Inequality in Latin America / 267 unknown, adjusting for underreporting often tends to produce estimates of inequality with an upward bias.
Székely and Hilgert (14) provide detailed evidence that Latin American surveys are particularly deficient when it comes to measuring the income of those at the top of the income distribution. For instance, they find that in several countries, the average income of the top 10 richest households in the surveys was significantly smaller than the wages of a typical manager of an average Latin American firm, suggesting that the income of the rich is grossly underestimated. 4 The now well-known adjustment process, which was originally outlined by Altimir (15) , is based on reconciling the income reported in household surveys with macro data from the national accounts. This was motivated by the systematically lower income per capita obtained from household survey data, as compared with the national accounts. 5 To give a rough sketch of the process: first, aggregate per capita income by category is obtained from the household survey data and then compared with that derived from the national accounts. Then, based 268 / Montecino Table 3 Differences between ECLAC and SEDLAC Gini coefficients, percent on the gap between the two, an adjustment factor is derived for each income category. In the final step, the income reported in the surveys is scaled up by multiplying it by the adjustment factor.
One detail about the final step deserves special attention. According to Altimir (15, p. 152), it is reasonable to assume that the underreporting of property income is limited to the top quintile of the income distribution. Thus, whereas the adjustment factors are applied to the entire distribution of the other income categories, only the top quintile of reported property incomes receives the adjustment for property income.
Despite the importance of this well-known correction process, relatively little has been written on its merits and shortcomings. Several studies have pointed out that the adjustment process may simply replace the bias from underreporting with a new bias from the correction method, but few have tried to systematically quantify the tradeoff or how it affects different inequality indexes. 6 A notable exception is Paraje (12) , who employs an experimental approach to quantify the magnitude of the bias introduced by the underreporting of property income and the bias produced by the national accounts-based adjustment method. Using a range of simulated income distributions with varying patterns and degrees of underreporting, Paraje (12, pp. 74-83) shows that the bias from underreporting in an unadjusted sample is broadly comparable in magnitude to-and in some cases smaller than-the bias from the adjustment process. For instance, in one simulation where property income is concentrated in the top 10 percent of the income distribution and as many as 75 percent of survey respondents underreport, the underreporting bias leads to an underestimation of the Gini coefficient of between 5.6 and 5.8 percent. The bias from the correction method, on the other hand, leads to an overestimation of the Gini coefficient of between 2 and 4.3 percent. Paraje also shows that of all the most common inequality measures, the Gini coefficient is relatively less sensitive to underreporting adjustments made at both the lower and upper tails of the income distribution.
The magnitude of the differences between ECLAC and SEDLAC data wouldn't matter very much for a fixed-effects approach if these were constant across time, because what is important for this type of analysis is the variation within each country. However, the differences between the two datasets seem to fluctuate quite a lot in some countries, and in a few cases are most pronounced in the first few observations. Since the fixed-effects approach relies on accounting for Decreasing Inequality in Latin America / 269 6 It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a full survey of this literature. However, see Lustig and Mitchell (19) for early applications of the adjustment process to poverty estimates in Mexico. Helwege and Birch (13, provide a useful survey of the differences in the handling of income surveys by various international organizations. Ferreira (20) discusses some problems with common underreporting correction methods. Bravo and Valderrama Torres (21) decompose the effects of the adjustment process by income category for the case of Chile's Casen surveys.
unobserved time-invariant factors by allowing country-specific intercepts, the large observed differences between ECLAC and SEDLAC data for the first few observations can have large implications and alter the sign and significance of the explanatory variables.
To give a concrete example: Venezuela's initial inequality is much higher according to ECLAC's data than according to SEDLAC's, which contributes to a positive fixed effect instead of the negative one reported by McLeod and Lustig. This could be interpreted as meaning that the unobserved impact of historical and institutional factors increases inequality in Venezuela according to ECLAC data, while SEDLAC data suggest that inequality, in the long run, should be lower than current levels. Clearly, both cannot simultaneously be true, and the difference matters quite a lot when interpreting Venezuela's experience over the past decade.
McLeod and Lustig note that they avoid ECLAC's data because its correction for income underreporting is "controversial" (1, p. 30). Although relying instead on SEDLAC's unadjusted data certainly has its appeals, and ECLAC's adjustment method is imperfect, there is nevertheless no clear a priori rationale for discarding an imperfect adjustment in favor of no adjustment at all, especially when the bias due to underreporting is probably at least comparable to the bias introduced by the correction method. Thus, in the absence of compelling criteria for privileging one dataset over the other, it is reasonable to suggest that econometric results should be robust to both sources.
CONCLUSION
This article examined the claim that Latin America's "social democratic" governments have effectively lowered income inequality in their respective countries through effective policies, while "left-populist" governments have not. It found that using inequality data from ECLAC leads to the exactly opposite conclusion: it is the "left-populist" countries (i.e., Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) that appear to have effectively lowered income inequality. Thus the original results reported by McLeod and Lustig (1) seem to be highly sensitive to the use of data from SEDLAC.
Further, the McLeod and Lustig study is problematic for a whole host of reasons, beginning with the arbitrary and ill-defined nature of the distinction between the two types of government that it is comparing. It is not clear that the distinction captures anything more than a general antipathy toward one group of governments and a more positive attitude toward the other group. As noted above, Chile's "social democratic" period could just as easily have begun with the first Concertación transitional government in 1989, and Brazil's with the Cardoso administration of 1995-2002. And as also noted, there are econometric indications that McLeod and Lustig's model may be otherwise misspecified.
For these reasons, the current study makes no attempt, as McLeod and Lustig do, to draw conclusions about the relative effectiveness of countries classified into these two, rather dubious categories in reducing income inequality. Nor does it argue that one dataset, which produces opposite results from the other, is superior to that other dataset. Rather, the aim is simply to caution against attempts to draw conclusions with potentially major policy implications when something as fundamental as the choice of dataset so drastically alters the results. Thus, for further cross-country econometric research on the determinants of income inequality in Latin America to be useful, more effort needs to be devoted to systematically understanding the differences between the main sources of data on income inequality and the relative biases introduced by their underlying methods. In this context, empirical research on the patterns of income underreporting, both between countries and across time, as well as their impact on the measurement of inequality in Latin America, would probably be a fruitful avenue for future research.
Note -This article was originally published by the Center for Economic and Policy Research in October 2011.
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Appendix Table 1 Summary statistics (number of countries = 18; number of periods = 7)
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